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Abstract
We report on the design and implementation of an extensible pro-
gramming language and its intrinsic support for formal verifica-
tion. Our language is targeted at low-level programming of infras-
tructure like operating systems and runtime systems. It is based on
a cross-platform core combining characteristics of assembly lan-
guages and compiler intermediate languages. From this founda-
tion, we take literally the saying that C is a “macro assembly lan-
guage”: we introduce an expressive notion of certified low-level
macros, sufficient to build up the usual features of C and beyond
as macros with no special support in the core. Furthermore, our
macros have integrated support for strongest postcondition calcu-
lation and verification condition generation, so that we can provide
a high-productivity formal verification environment within Coq for
programs composed from any combination of macros. Our macro
interface is expressive enough to support features that low-level
programs usually only access through external tools with no formal
guarantees, such as declarative parsing or SQL-inspired querying.
The abstraction level of these macros only imposes a compile-time
cost, via the execution of functional Coq programs that compute
programs in our intermediate language; but the run-time cost is
not substantially greater than for more conventional C code. We
describe our experiences constructing a full C-like language stack
using macros, with some experiments on the verifiability and per-
formance of individual programs running on that stack.
Categories and Subject Descriptors F.3.1 [Logics and meanings
of programs]: Mechanical verification; D.3.4 [Programming Lan-
guages]: Compilers
Keywords generative metaprogramming; interactive proof assis-
tants; low-level programming languages; functional programming
1. Introduction
A fundamental tension in programming language design is between
performance and abstraction. Closer to the high-performance end
of the spectrum, we have languages like C, which are often used
to implement low-level infrastructure that many applications de-
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pend on. Examples include operating systems and runtime systems,
which today are almost exclusively written in C and its close rela-
tives.
Need we always choose between performance and abstraction?
One approach to retaining both is metaprogramming, from basic
cases of textual macro substitution as in the C preprocessor, to so-
phisticated code generators like Yacc. Here we employ abstractions
that in a sense are compile-time only, running programs that gen-
erate programs in C or other low-level languages. As a result, we
incur no run-time cost to abstraction.
Unfortunately, code generation is hard to get right. The C pre-
processor’s textual substitution mechanism allows for all sorts of
scoping errors in macro definitions. There exist widely used alter-
natives, like the macro systems of Lisp/Scheme, OCaml (Camlp4),
and Haskell (Template Haskell), which can enforce “hygiene” re-
quirements on lexical scoping in macro definitions.
The functional programming community knows well the advan-
tages of code generation with languages like Haskell and ML as
metalanguages for embedded domain-specific languages (DSLs).
That is, one represents the programs of some object language, like
C or CUDA, as data within the metalanguage, making it possible
to compute programs of the object language at compile time using
all of the abstraction features of the metalanguage.
There is a tower of static assurance levels for this kind of gener-
ative metaprogramming. Tools like Yacc receive little static assur-
ance from their implementation languages, as they output source
code as strings that the implementation language does not analyze.
Conventional macro systems, from primitive token substitution in
C to hygienic Scheme macros, can provide stronger lexical guar-
antees. Next in the tower are languages that allow for static typing
of macros, guaranteeing that any of their applications produce both
scope-safe and type-safe object-language code. Languages in this
category include MetaML [30] and MacroML [13], for homoge-
neous metaprogramming where the meta and object languages are
the same; and MetaHaskell [22], for heterogeneous metaprogram-
ming where meta and object languages are different (e.g., Haskell
and CUDA). Our contribution in this paper is to continue higher
up this tower of static guarantees: we support separate static check-
ing of macros to guarantee that they always produce functionally
correct object-language code.
The programming language and associated verification tools
will need to provide a proof rule for each macro. A naive proof
rule just expands macro applications using their definitions, pro-
viding no abstraction benefit. We could ask instead that macro defi-
nitions include proof rules, and that the verification system requires
programmers to prove that their macro definitions respect the as-
sociated proof rules. In effect, we have a macro system support-
ing modularity in the style of well-designed functions, classes, or
libraries, with clear separation between implementation and inter-
face.
In this paper, we report on our experiences building such a
macro system for a low-level language, intended as a replacement
for C in the systems programming domain. This macro system
is part of the Bedrock library for the Coq proof assistant, which
provides an integrated environment for program implementation,
specification, and verification. A prior publication [8] introduced
Bedrock’s support for proof automation, implementing example
programs using an earlier version of our macro system but not de-
scribing it in detail. Since that paper was written, the macro system
has evolved, and we have used it to implement more interesting
examples. We now present its design and implementation in detail,
along with the higher-level language design principle that motivates
it.
Our metalanguage is Gallina, the functional programming lan-
guage in Coq’s logic. Our object language is a tiny compiler inter-
mediate language. We build up the usual features of C via unpriv-
ileged macros, and then we go further and implement features like
declarative parsing and declarative querying of data structures as
macros rather than ad-hoc external tools like Yacc and MySQL.
To support productive formal verification, we tag each macro
with a proof rule. To be more precise, each macro contains a pred-
icate transformer, which evolves a logical assertion to reflect the
effects of a program statement; and a verification condition gener-
ator, which outputs proof obligations associated with a use of the
macro. These are some of the standard tools of highly automated
program verification, and requiring them of all macros lets us build
a generic verification environment that supports automated proofs
about programs built with macros drawn from diverse sources. We
call the central abstraction certified low-level macros.
Our implementations and proofs have much in common with
compiler verification. For instance, CompCert [21] is a C com-
piler implemented in Coq with a proof that it preserves program
semantics. Each of our macro implementations looks like one case
of the CompCert compiler, dealing with a specific source language
syntax construct, paired with the corresponding correctness proof
cases. A specific program may draw upon several macros imple-
mented by different programmers, who never considered how their
macros might interact. The proof approach from CompCert does
not extend straightforwardly to this setting, since each CompCert
subproof refers to one or more simulation relations between the
programs of different fixed languages. It is not apparent how such
an approach could be extended to verify compilation rules for ex-
tensible languages. For instance, in that conventional setting, func-
tion pointers may be specified informally as “points to the code our
compiler would generate from the corresponding source-level func-
tion body,” an explanation that does not adapt naturally to the case
of an extensible compiler. We would rather not verify handling of
function pointers relative to a particular set of available macros.
The key selling point of compile-time metaprogramming is per-
formance. Programmers will come up with different code con-
structs that mimic those available in higher-level programming lan-
guages, but implemented in a way that facilitates case-specific op-
timization and in general promotes performance. We are able to
attach specifications to such macros in a way that makes reasoning
about use of a macro more like reasoning about a function call than
reasoning directly about low-level code after macro expansion.
At a high level, then, our contribution can be viewed alter-
natively as an extensible programming language or an extensible
Hoare-logic program verifier. We present the first low-level lan-
guage with a notion of macros that cleanly separates interface
and implementation, to such an extent as to enable mostly au-
tomated correctness verification without macro expansion. We
Constants c ::= [width-32 bitvectors]
Code labels ` ::= ...
Registers r ::= Sp | Rp | Rv
Addresses a ::= r | c | r + c
Lvalues L ::= r | [a]8 | [a]32
Rvalues R ::= L | c | `
Binops o ::= + | − | ×
Tests t ::= =| 6= | < | ≤
Instructions i ::= L← R | L← R o R
Jumps j ::= goto R | if (R t R) then ` else `
Specs S ::= ...
Blocks B ::= ` : {S} i∗; j
Modules M ::= B∗
Figure 1. Syntax of the Bedrock IL
prove correctness theorems within a framework for modular ver-
ification, where we can verify libraries separately and then link
together their correctness theorems into whole-program correct-
ness theorems, without revisiting details of code implementation
or proof. This modularity holds even in the presence of a mutable
heap that may hold callable code pointers, thanks to the XCAP [26]
program logic that sits at the base of our framework.
The remaining sections of this paper will walk through the steps
of building our stack of macros. We begin with a tiny assembly-like
language and proceed to introduce our notion of certified low-level
macros for it, build macros for basic C-like constructs, add support
for local variables and function calls, and culminate in the high-
level macros for declarative parsing and querying. Next we evaluate
the effectiveness of our platform in terms of program verifiability
and run-time performance, and we finish with a comparison to
related work.
Source code to both the Bedrock library and our example pro-
grams is available in the latest Bedrock source distribution at:
http://plv.csail.mit.edu/bedrock/
2. The Bedrock IL
The lowest layer of Bedrock is a simple intermediate language in-
spired by common assembly languages. This Bedrock IL is easy
to compile to those “real” languages, using only localized replace-
ment of IL concepts with assembly language constructs. A single
verification result applies to all target architectures. So far, we have
built a compiler to AMD64 assembly (currently unverified), and
we expect it will be easy to implement sound translations to other
popular architectures like ARM and 32-bit x86.
Figure 1 gives the full syntax of the Bedrock IL. There are small
finite sets of registers, addressing modes (for both 8-bit and 32-bit
memory accesses), and forms of lvalues and rvalues (borrowing C
terminology). Straightline instructions do assignment or arithmetic,
and jump instructions do unconditional branching or branching
based on the result of an arithmetic comparison. A standalone
code module is a set of basic blocks, each with a code label and
a specification.
Bedrock is based on the XCAP program logic [26] of Ni and
Shao, and block specifications use the XCAP assertion language,
which supports a limited form of higher-order logic tailored to
reasoning about first-class code pointers. A module is correct when
every one of its blocks satisfies two conditions:
• Progress: When control enters the block in a machine state
satisfying the spec, control continues safely at least until the
end of the block.
• Preservation: When control enters the block in a machine state
satisfying the spec and exits the block by jumping to some other
block, the spec of the new block is satisfied.
In this way, we can construct an inductive proof of infinite safe
execution, giving us memory safety. Further, we may also treat each
block spec as an assertion, so that we verify absence of assertion
failures, giving us functional correctness. XCAP supports separate
verification and linking of modules, via mechanisms that we will
not go into here, but we do want to emphasize that XCAP supports
modular verification, where libraries can be verified separately in
a way that permits composition of their correctness theorems to
conclude whole-program theorems. It is not trivial to design a
framework that permits such modular proof rules in the presence of
a mutable higher-order heap, where code from one module might
find in the heap a pointer to code from another module written and
verified independently. Building on XCAP enables us to realize this
level of modularity without doing much explicit extra work.
What does it mean for a Bedrock IL program to be safe? There
are two sorts of bad instruction executions that violate safety. First,
a jump to a nonexistent code label is illegal. Second, a Bedrock
IL program is restricted to read or write only memory addresses
allowed by a configurable memory policy.
These informal notions are codified in a conventional Coq op-
erational semantics. We support sound compilation to a variety
of assembly languages by considering machine states to contain
a read-only component describing the byte ordering of words in
memory, with enough expressiveness to describe little-endian, big-
endian, and other orders. As a result, we can work with a trivial “ar-
ray of bytes” memory model, rather than the more complex mem-
ory model used in, e.g., the informal ANSI C semantics and the
closely related formal semantics of CompCert [21]. The simplistic
memory model we adopt makes it difficult to reason about many
standard program transformations and optimizations, but we still
achieve reasonable performance with an optimizer-free implemen-
tation (see Section 6).
There is a great benefit to starting from a language with such a
simple semantics. Our final platform is foundational, in the sense
that we produce formal proofs that can be checked and audited
with relatively small trusted code bases. We need to trust the Coq
proof checker and its dependencies, which can be made small
compared to program verifiers in general. Beyond that, we must
make sure that the statement of the theorem we prove matches our
informal notion of program safety or correctness. The theorems that
come out of our system are stated only in terms of the Bedrock
IL operational semantics, which is quite small and easy to audit.
Most importantly in the context of this paper, the final theorem
statements are independent of any details of our macro system.
A final foundational theorem will be of the form “if execution
begins at code address `1 in a state satisfying the spec of `1, then if
execution ever reaches code address `2, the spec of `2 will be satis-
fied.” In the sections that follow, we will introduce convenient nota-
tions not just for programs, but also for specifications; for instance,
see the notation for specifying functions with local variables in Sec-
tion 4. If such a notation appears in a final correctness theorem, then
its definition must be considered part of the trusted base. However,
we are able to prove final theorems that reduce our notations to sim-
pler concepts. For instance, while we may verify the main() func-
tion of a program against a precondition-postcondition-style spec-
ification inspired by separation logic [28], the final theorem state-
ment need only say that main() requires “all memory addresses
between 0 and N are allowed by the memory access policy.” We
prove that the latter implies the former, and so a final audit of a
verified program need only ensure that the latter is accurate.
Definition appendS : spec := SPEC("x", "y") reserving 2
Al ls1, Al ls2,
PRE[V] sll ls1 (V "x") ∗ sll ls2 (V "y")
POST[R] sll (ls1 ++ ls2) R.
bfunction "append"("x", "y", "r", "tmp") [appendS]
If ("x" = 0) {
Return "y"
} else {
"r"← "x";;
"tmp"←∗ "x" + 4;;
[Al p1, Al x, Al ls1, Al ls2,
PRE[V] d V "x" 6= $0 e ∗ d V "tmp" = p1 e ∗ V "x" 7→ x
∗ (V "x" +ˆ $4) 7→ p1 ∗ sll ls1 p1 ∗ sll ls2 (V "y")
POST[R] d R = V "r" e ∗ sll (x :: ls1 ++ ls2) (V "x") ]
While ("tmp" 6= 0) {
"x"← "tmp";;
"tmp"←∗ "x" + 4
};;
"x" + 4 ∗← "y";;
Return "r"
}
end
Figure 2. Bedrock implementation of destructive list append
3. Certified Low-Level Macros
Bedrock’s structured programming system uses macros to present
a C-like view of the Bedrock IL. Figure 2 shows an example, a
destructive linked-list append function, beginning with its formal
specification, whose explanation we put off until later. The body
of the implementation uses standard control flow constructs like
if and while to group together sequences of operations on local
variables, which are named with string literals to appease Coq’s
lexer. (In this paper, we never use a string literal for its more
conventional purpose in C-like code, so it is safe to assume that
literals indicate object-language identifiers.) A token←∗ indicates
a memory read operation, while ∗← indicates a write. A loop
invariant appears within square brackets. We will have a bit more to
say later about the language of specifications and invariants, though
it is not our focus in this paper, as our architecture applies to other
specification languages, too.
For now, the take-away message from Figure 2 is that it denotes
a Coq program for computing an assembly program, in the style
of heterogeneous generative metaprogramming. None of the con-
trol flow constructs are built into the language, but rather they use
macros that any Bedrock programmer can define without modify-
ing the library. We also want to prove that the computed assembly
program is correct. Programming, compilation, and proving are all
done completely within the normal Coq environment.
We will introduce our central concept of macro in two stages.
First we introduce the aspects needed to support compilation of
programs, and then we add the features to support verification.
3.1 The Code Generation Part of a Macro
In our setting, a macro stands for a statement in the sense of C-like
languages. To make sense of this concept, we must impose a notion
of structured programs on top of the freeform control flow of the
Bedrock IL.
Figure 3 summarizes such an interface. The fundamental task
of a macro is to mutate a program by appending new basic blocks
to it. Successive blocks are assigned successive numeric labels. To
run a macro, it must be passed one input: the exit label of the block
its statement should jump to when finished. This label will have
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Figure 3. The interface of a low-level macro
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Figure 5. Sketch of macro for if..then..else
been allocated previously by other macros. A macro runs by not
only creating new basic blocks, but also returning one more value:
an entry label within the freshly generated code blocks. A macro’s
statement is run by jumping to the entry label.
Consider the very basic example of a macro for converting a
straightline IL instruction into a statement. Figure 4 sketches a
simple implementation. Macros are implemented as functional pro-
grams in Coq’s logic, so it is natural to think of them as statement
combinators. The straightline code combinator takes an instruction
i as its parameter. When run, the macro allocates a single block,
consisting of i followed by a direct jump to the exit label. The out-
put entry label points to the new block.
A more involved example is the if..then..else macro, as sketched
in Figure 5. While Bedrock IL includes a standard conditional jump
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Figure 6. The interface of a certified low-level macro
instruction, we would rather program in terms of a higher-level
statement combinator that hides details of code block label allo-
cation. The if..then..else combinator takes three arguments: a test
expression, suitable as an argument to Bedrock IL’s low-level con-
ditional jump; a then statement, to run when the test passes; and an
else statement, to run when the test fails. The two statement param-
eters will generally be constructed with further macro applications,
and the if..then..else combinator should work correctly regardless
of the details of the two statements.
An instance of the if..then..else combinator works as follows:
• The macro is passed an exit label as input. The same label is
passed along unchanged as the exit label inputs to the then
and else statements. That is, regardless of which way the test
expression evaluates, the statement we jump to should exit the
if..then..else upon completion.
• Each of the then and else macros generates some code blocks
to represent itself, outputting an entry label for each. The
if..then..else macro adds one more code block, a conditional
jump using the test expression, jumping to the entry label of ei-
ther the then or else case, depending on how the test evaluates.
• Finally, the overall macro outputs the address of the conditional
test as its own entry label.
The working of the macro is broadly similar to standard com-
pilation strategies. To support an expressive macro system, it is
crucial to choose a macro interface compatible with a wide range
of compilation rules. Many other such architectures are possible.
For instance, Benton et al. [2] use an intermediate language with
explicitly scoped local labels. The verification support of our ap-
proach ought to adapt straightforwardly to many such compilation
schemes, since in a sense verification considers only a macro’s in-
terface and not its implementation.
It is worth mentioning one mundane aspect of macro implemen-
tation, which is registering concrete parsing notations for macros.
We rely on Coq’s extensible parser for this purpose. For instance,
here is the notation we introduce for calls to the if..then..else com-
binator If_:
Notation "’If’ c { b1 } ’else’ { b2 }" := (If_ c b1 b2)
(no associativity, at level 95, c at level 0) : SP_scope.
All of the standard control-flow constructs of C-like languages
are straightforward to encode in our macro system, but, before we
consider more examples, we back up to extend the macro interface
for verification support.
3.2 Verification Support
Figure 6 gives the expanded interface of certified low-level macros,
where we add the ingredients needed to build a formal verifica-
tion environment that supports automated proofs about programs
that use macros drawn from diverse sources. At a high level, the
addition is this: We previously defined a macro as a compila-
tion rule. Verification support involves also including a predicate
transformer (closely related to the idea of a strongest postcondi-
tion calculator) and a verification condition generator.
The predicate transformer of a macro maps a precondition
to a postcondition. Both sorts of conditions are logical predicates
over Bedrock IL machine states; that is, they can be represented
as functions typed like state→ Prop, returning logical propo-
sitions given machine states as input. The precondition describes
the machine state on entry to a statement, and the postcondition
describes the machine state when control exits the statement. The
postcondition is computed as a function, or transformation, of the
precondition, leading to the name predicate transformer. At a high
level, the predicate transformer of a macro answers the question
what does this macro do?
A macro also includes a verification condition generator,
which given a precondition outputs a logical formula (a verifica-
tion condition) that the programmer must prove. If the verification
condition is false, the statement may not work as expected. At a
high level, the verification condition generator answers the ques-
tion which uses of this macro are safe and functionally correct?
More formally, we define the verification part of a macro with:
Predicates P = state→ Prop
Predicate transformers T = P→ P
Verification condition generators C = P→ Prop
Verification parts of macros V = T× C
At a high level, the intent of these definitions is as follows:
Consider a macro definition M(x1, . . . , xn) = E, expanding
an M invocation into some more primitive statement E. Let the
associated predicate transformer be T ∈ T and the verification
condition generator be C ∈ C. Client code sees the following
Hoare-logic proof rule for a macro invocation with a particular
precondition P ∈ P:
{P ∧ C(P )}M(e1, . . . , en){T (P )}
The formal version of this notation is complicated by the need to
deal with sets of IL basic blocks, rather than the usual structured
statements. To give an intuition for those details, we return to
extended versions of our previous example macros. First, consider
the straightline code macro with instruction parameter i. When
called with precondition P , the macro produces:
• Verification condition: ∀s. P (s)⇒ ∃s′. s i−→ s′
• Postcondition: λs. ∃s′. P (s′) ∧ s′ i−→ s
Preconditions and postconditions are predicates, or functions
from machine states to logical propositions, so we often notate
them as anonymous λ functions. The judgment s i−→ s′ asserts
that running instruction i transforms state s into state s′. Instruction
executions that would violate Bedrock IL safety do not belong to
this relation.
Thus, the verification condition expresses the idea that the pre-
condition implies safety of executing the instruction i. The post-
condition is actually the strongest postcondition for this particular
macro, denoting exactly the set of states that could be reached by
running i in a state satisfying P . In general, macros need to ex-
pose sound postconditions, which include all possible states upon
statement exit, but macros need not always return strongest post-
conditions. Indeed, the chance to return weaker postconditions is
essential for supporting separation of interface and implementation
in macros, where some details of macro implementation are hid-
den in specifications that are easier to reason about than strongest
postconditions.
Consider now the if..then..else macro, where the parameters are
a conditional test e, a then statement with predicate transformer T1
and verification condition generator C1, and an else statement with
predicate transformer T0 and verification condition generator C0.
If the overall precondition is P , the macro produces:
• Verification condition:
(∧
b∈{0,1} Cb(λs. P (s) ∧ s
e−→ b)
)
∧ (∀s. P (s)⇒ ∃b. s e−→ b)
• Postcondition: λs′. ∨b∈{0,1} Tb(λs. P (s) ∧ s e−→ b)(s′)
We write s e−→ b to indicate that conditional test e evaluates
to Boolean value b ∈ {0, 1} in state s. The overall verification
condition is the conjunction of the two sub-statements’ verification
conditions, plus the requirement that the precondition imply safety
of evaluating the conditional test. The overall postcondition is a
disjunction of the sub-statements’ postconditions. In each case, we
pass off extended preconditions that combine the original precon-
dition P with information on the outcome of the test e.
We have decided that a macro constitutes a parsing rule, a com-
pilation rule, a predicate transformer, and a verification condition
generator. The last crucial ingredient is a proof that all of the above
agree with each other in an appropriately sound way. That is, we
package macros with dependently typed records that contain not
just functions but also machine-checked proofs about those func-
tions. Such a thing is easy to do in Coq, as shown by our definition
of macros below. (These definitions actually occur in a Coq sec-
tion that introduces parameters describing the code’s assumptions
about its own module and others, but we omit such details here to
simplify the presentation.)
Note that this code incorporates a few optimizations, including
representing verification conditions as lists of propositions instead
of single propositions, to allow conjunction of verification condi-
tions without creating arbitrarily bushy conjunction trees; and stag-
ing of macros in a manner similar to currying, so that programs
may be verified without the need to generate code for them. We
write Prop for the type of logical propositions, or standalone facts;
and assert for the type of predicates over machine states, or func-
tions from states to Prop.
(* Delayed code generation part of macro output *)
Record codeGen (Precondition : assert) (Base Exit : N)
(Postcondition : assert) (VerifCond : list Prop) := {
Entry : N;
Blocks : list (assert ∗ block);
PreconditionOk : ∃ bl, nth_error Blocks (nat_of_N Entry)
= Some (Precondition, bl);
BlocksOk : vcs VerifCond
→ Exit < Base
→ List.Forall (fun p⇒ blockOk
(imps Blocks Base Exit Postcondition) (fst p) (snd p))
Blocks
}.
(* Immediate verification part of macro output *)
Record codeOut (Precondition : assert) := {
Postcondition : assert;
VerifCond : list Prop;
Generate : ∀ Base Exit : N,
codeGen Precondition Base Exit Postcondition VerifCond
}.
(* Overall type of a macro, a dependent function type *)
Definition cmd := ∀ cin : assert, codeOut cin.
We will explain these definitions in reverse. A macro, of type
cmd, has a dependent function type, where the return type of the
function is allowed to mention the value of the actual parameter. In
this case, the formal parameter cin is the input precondition, and
we return a value of a type codeOut cin specialized to the pre-
condition. Where our earlier less formal definitions treated predi-
cate transformers and verification condition generators as indepen-
dent functions over preconditions, here we instead make the whole
macro a function on preconditions.
A codeOut record contains the computed postcondition and
verification condition, as well as Generate, a function that we call
if we wish to do code generation, too.
A codeGen record contains the output of code generation.
While our earlier sketches refer to generation of new code blocks
as an imperative process, we implement generation in Coq via re-
turning lists of new blocks only. Furthermore, a Generate function
is passed not only the Exit label for a statement, but also Base, the
address that will be given to the first new code block returned by
this macro. In general, the nth block in the output will have label
Base + n. It is important to fix the labeling convention to allow
the macro to create internal jumps in its code blocks.
Specifically, the codeGen record includes the Entry label of
the statement and the list of its new Blocks. Additionally, proofs
of two theorems must be packaged in the same dependent record.
The PreconditionOk theorem asserts that the requested precon-
dition really has been assigned as the spec of the statement’s entry
block. The BlocksOk theorem asserts that every block in Blocks
is correct according to the rules of XCAP.
This latter statement uses a predicate blockOk that can be
thought of as a judgment Γ ` B, asserting the correctness of basic
block B under the assumptions in Γ, a finite map from code labels
to assumed preconditions for their associated blocks. Here we build
Γ with a function imps, which constructs a finite map containing
(a) the Exit label with spec Postcondition, (b) the macro’s
Blocks themselves with their associated specs, and (c) any label-
spec pairs for other modules that are listed explicitly as imports.
We also note that BlocksOk takes as premises (a) the truth of the
verification condition and (b) an assertion that the Exit label is less
than the Base label, so that the macro knows it will not accidentally
generate a block with the same address as the exit block it should
jump to.
The new components of certified macros are very similar to con-
ventional logical manipulations in program verification tools and
verified compilers. The power of the idea comes from formalizing
the requirements on statements with a precise, open interface. We
have proved a Coq theorem that any statement satisfying the cmd in-
terface is compiled into a valid XCAP module, when its verification
condition holds and it is started in a state satisfying the claimed pre-
condition. This notion of module validity follows XCAP’s modular
verification approach, so that it is possible to link such theorems to-
gether to produce theorems about larger composite modules, with-
out revisiting module internals.
We close out this section with more examples of combinators
for conventional C-like control constructs, before turning in the fol-
lowing sections to local variables, calling conventions, and higher-
level notations not commonly supported in C-like languages.
3.3 More Examples
Certified low-level macros are compatible with classic Hoare-logic
proof rules that require the programmer to provide invariants. For
instance, consider a macro for a while loop, with conditional test
e, loop invariant I , and a body statement that has predicate trans-
former T and verification condition generator C. The macro’s log-
ical outputs then mirror standard proof rules, where P again stands
for the precondition passed into the macro.
• Verification condition: C(λs. I(s) ∧ s e−→ 1)
∧ (∀s. P (s)⇒ I(s))
∧ (∀s. I(s)⇒ ∃b. s e−→ b)
∧ (∀s. T (λs′. I(s′) ∧ s′ e−→ 1)(s)⇒ I(s))
• Postcondition: λs. I(s) ∧ s e−→ 0
The respective verification conditions are the conditions of the
loop body, an implication from loop precondition to loop invariant,
an implication from loop invariant to safety of conditional test, and
an implication from loop body postcondition to loop invariant. The
overall loop postcondition is the conjunction of the loop invariant
with the failure of the conditional test.
It is also possible to write macros for function calls, where the
crucial challenge is to reason about the passing of a return pointer as
first-class data. The macro must allocate a new block whose address
will be passed as return pointer. We follow the convention that a
function receives its return pointer in Bedrock IL register Rp. The
compilation part of a function-call macro may simply use its own
exit label as the return pointer.
Since there is no succinct logical counterpart to i−→ for express-
ing the effect of a whole function call, we ask the programmer to
provide an invariant I , characterizing the machine state after the
function call returns. To state the logical outputs of the function-
call macro, we use the XCAP notation {P}p to indicate that ma-
chine word p is the address of a basic block whose spec is implied
by condition P . As is usual at the assembly level, our programs are
effectively in continuation-passing style, so it is natural to reason
about first-class return pointers with Hoare doubles (preconditions
only) rather than the more common Hoare triples (preconditions
and postconditions).
As usual, below let P stand for the precondition passed into the
function-call macro. Additionally, let Q be the spec of the function
being called, which is in precondition-only form just as for return
pointers.
• Verification condition:
∀s, p, s′. P (s) ∧ s Rp←p−→ s′ ∧ {I}p⇒ Q(s′)
• Postcondition: I
The verification condition is stated in terms of the assignment of
an arbitrary code pointer p to the return pointer register Rp, subject
to the constraint that invariant I is a valid spec for p’s basic block.
The invariant I itself is used as the call’s postcondition.
A complete calling convention also deals with function argu-
ments and local variables. Further, the reader may be worried about
the readability of complex specs in continuation-passing style with
Hoare doubles. The next section addresses both concerns, describ-
ing how we use more macros and other notational conventions to
present a more normal perspective on C-like functions.
4. Local Variables and Calling Conventions
Figure 2 contained a specification in a conventional precondition-
and-postcondition style, hiding the complexities of continuation-
passing-style reasoning. As another example, here is Coq code for
a spec we might write for an in-place linked list reversal function.
The predicate sll stands for “singly linked list,” and its parameters
are a functional list and a pointer to the root of a matching linked
list in memory.
SPEC("l") reserving 5
Al L,
PRE[V] sll L (V "l")
POST[R] sll (rev L) R
In order, the four lines of such a spec may be thought of as:
1. A header giving the function’s formal arguments, plus how
many free additional stack slots it requires (reserving clause)
2. Universal quantifiers for specification variables (similar to
ghost variables) that may be mentioned in both precondition
and postcondition
3. A precondition, introducing a local name V for a function as-
signing values to actual arguments
4. A postcondition, introducing a local name R for the function
return value
A more compact notation, closer to usual Hoare logic conven-
tions but with explicit use of functions to handle binding of V and
R, might be:
∀L. {λV. sll(L, V (l))}f(l, 5){λV,R. sll(rev(L), R)}
A mechanical translation produces a continuation-passing style
version of this spec, where we only need to assign a precondition.
As is usual with this sort of translation, universal quantifiers scoped
over both precondition and postcondition turn into existential quan-
tifiers appearing within the precondition; and calling-convention
registers appear explicitly, where Rp holds the return pointer and
Rv the function return value.
{∃L, V. sll(L, V (l)) ∧ {sll(rev(L),Rv)}Rp}f(l, 5)
In this specification, the call stack is still treated implicitly. We
must eventually be explicit about call stack as data structure to
bridge the semantic gap to the Bedrock IL. Here is the final version
of the specification, using a predicate locals to represent a call stack
frame. Register Sp holds the stack pointer.
{∃L, V. locals({l}, V, 5, Sp) ∗ sll(L, V (l))
∧ {∃V ′. locals({l}, V ′, 5, Sp) ∗ sll(rev(L),Rv)}Rp}f
Here locals is just another abstract predicate [27] like sll. A
fact locals(D,V, n, v) says that a stack frame with domain D
and variable values V is located at address v, and it has at least
n more free stack slots remaining. The overall list-reverse spec
above indicates that the stack frame must be present with some
variable values V at call time, and the separating conjunction ∗
expresses that the call stack and the input linked list must occupy
disjoint memory. A nested Hoare double ascribes a precondition
to the return pointer Rp. This “postcondition” is the same as the
function “precondition” except that (1) local variable values are
allowed to change to some arbitrary V ′ and (2) the linked list has
been reversed.
In general, a traditional function spec looks like ∀~x. {P}f(~y, n){Q},
where P is a function over V , and Q is a function over V and R.
The desugaring of this spec into a low-level XCAP precondition is:
{∃~x, V. locals(~y, V, n, Sp) ∗ P (V )
∧ {∃V ′. locals(~y, V ′, n, Sp) ∗Q(V,Rv)}Rp}f
To do code generation and computation of verification condi-
tions and postconditions, a macro now needs to know the local
variable set ~y and the reserved stack slot count n. Therefore, we add
these two values as additional parameters to each macro. We do not
update any of the logical components of macros; local variables
are instead handled in a more traditional macro expansion style,
without any new hiding of implementation from interface. For in-
stance, a statement that reads a local variable will be compiled to
refer directly to the concrete offset of that variable from the stack
pointer, with verification conditions that reveal the compilation de-
tails directly. We have extended Bedrock’s separation logic proof
automation to reason properly about the interaction of such stack
pointer indirection and the locals predicate.
5. Higher-Level Notations
Certified low-level macros do not merely encode strongest post-
condition calculators, to declare the effects of statements. Instead,
macro authors have the freedom to expose weaker postconditions,
just as the author of a conventional function may choose a weaker
postcondition to enforce data abstraction or another form of in-
formation hiding. Conventional Hoare logics have a rule of con-
sequence facilitating this sort of hiding in a straightforward way,
where one may conclude {P}c{Q} from {P ′}c{Q′}, given P ⇒
P ′ and Q′ ⇒ Q.
We have implemented a simple wrapper combinator for macros,
embodying the rule of consequence. A programmer uses pre-
existing macros to implement a chunk of code, taking advantage
of the associated proof automation to simplify verification of that
chunk. Then the chunk may be wrapped with a new predicate trans-
former and verification condition generator, if appropriate condi-
tions are proved. In particular, say that the original statement has
transformer T ′ and generator C′, and the wrapper is introducing
new transformer T and generator C. The conditions that make the
wrapping sound are:
• ∀P. C(P )⇒ C′(P )
• ∀P, s. C(P ) ∧ T ′(P )(s)⇒ T (P )(s)
These conditions are a direct reinterpretation of the rule of con-
sequence, and they are feasible to prove for a variety of higher-
level notations that construct the underlying statements program-
matically, via recursive functions over macro parameters. In the rest
of this section, we give a motivating example for two higher-level
macros and then describe their implementations.
5.1 A Motivating Example
Figure 7 shows an example program that uses higher-level macros.
The program is a simple idealization of a network server process-
ing queries over a database. We deal not with network IO, but rather
just with decoding and processing requests and encoding the results
in memory. We say that the database is an array of machine inte-
gers, as is the packet of encoded query requests. The output of the
server is stored in a linked list.
The lefthand column of the figure gives the program implemen-
tation. Our program declares a module m, which imports function
malloc from module malloc, with specification mallocS. Next,
we define function main, beginning with its list of local variables,
including formal arguments.
The main body of the function is a loop over all requests con-
tained in the request array cmd. We take advantage of two high-level
macros to make our implementation more declarative.
First, we use a parsing syntax similar to ML-style pattern
matching, via the Match macro. Its arguments name an array, its
length (Size clause), and a local variable storing our current index
within the array (Position clause). A Match has a sequence of
cases consisting of patterns and bodies. A pattern is a sequence of
items that are either constants, to indicate that a specific machine
word value must be found in the corresponding array position; or
a variable name (string literal), to indicate that any machine word
may appear in the position. All variables are assigned the appropri-
ate values from the array before executing the body of a matching
pattern.
The other high-level macro is for declarative querying of arrays,
chosen as a simple example illustrating many of the same chal-
lenges applicable to more expressive SQL-style querying. The For
macro takes as arguments a loop variable to store an array index,
another variable to store the value found at that index (Holding
clause), the array to query (in clause), the length of that array
(Size clause), and a filter condition choosing which array cells to
Figure 7. Implementation, specification, and verification of our main case study program
(* Program implementation *)
Definition m := bimport [[ "malloc"!"malloc" @ [mallocS] ]]
bmodule "m" {{
bfunction "main"("cmd", "cmdLen", "data", "dataLen",
"output", "position", "posn", "lower", "upper",
"index", "value", "res", "node") [mainS]
"output"← 0;;
"position"← 0;;
[(* ... invariant omitted ... *)]
While ("position" < "cmdLen") {
Match "cmd" Size "cmdLen" Position "position" {
(* ValueIsGe *)
Case (0 ++ "posn" ++ "lower")
"res"← 0;;
[(* ... invariant omitted ... *)]
For "index" Holding "value" in "data"
Size "dataLen"
Where ((Index = "posn") && (Value ≥ "lower")) {
"res"← 1
};;
"node"← Call "malloc"!"malloc"(0)
[(* ... invariant omitted ... *)];;
"node" ∗← "res";;
"node" + 4 ∗← "output";;
"output"← "node"
end;;
(* MaxInRange *)
Case (1 ++ "lower" ++ "upper")
"res"← 0;;
[(* ... invariant omitted ... *)]
For "index" Holding "value" in "data"
Size "dataLen"
Where (("lower" ≤ Value) && (Value ≤ "upper")
&& (Value ≥ "res")) {
"res"← "value"
};;
"node"← Call "malloc"!"malloc"(0)
[(* ... invariant omitted ... *)];;
"node" ∗← "res";;
"node" + 4 ∗← "output";;
"output"← "node"
end;;
(* CollectBelow *)
Case (2 ++ "lower" ++ "upper")
[(* ... invariant omitted ... *)]
For "index" Holding "value" in "data"
Size "dataLen"
Where ((Index ≥ "lower")
&& (Value ≤ "upper")) {
"node"← Call "malloc"!"malloc"(0)
[(* ... invariant omitted ... *)];;
"node" ∗← "value";;
"node" + 4 ∗← "output";;
"output"← "node"
}
end
} Default {
Fail (* Impossible: the match was exhaustive. *)
}
};;
Return "output"
end
}}.
(* Requests that the server may receive.
* (W is the type of machine words.) *)
Inductive req :=
| ValueIsGe (index valueLowerBound : W)
(* Test if the value stored at this array index is
* at least as large as this value. *)
| MaxInRange (lowerBound upperBound : W)
(* Find the maximum value within the given
* range of values. *)
| CollectBelow (indexLowerBound valueUpperBound : W)
(* Collect a list of all values satisfying
* the given bounds on index and value. *).
(* Representation of requests as lists of words. *)
Definition encode (r : req) : list W :=
match r with
| ValueIsGe a b⇒ $0 :: a :: b :: nil
| MaxInRange a b⇒ $1 :: a :: b :: nil
| CollectBelow a b⇒ $2 :: a :: b :: nil
end.
(* Representation of sequences of requests *)
Fixpoint encodeAll (rs : list req) : list W :=
match rs with
| nil⇒ nil
| r :: rs’ ⇒ encode r ++ encodeAll rs’
end.
(* Omitted here: some helper functions *)
(* Compute the proper response to a request,
* as transformation on a list of output values. *)
Definition response (data acc : list W) (r : req) : list W :=
match r with
| ValueIsGe index lower⇒
valueIsGe data index lower :: acc
| MaxInRange lower upper⇒
maxInRange lower upper data :: acc
| CollectBelow lower upper⇒
collectBelow upper (skipn (wordToNat lower) data) acc
end.
(* Proper response to a request sequence *)
Definition responseAll (data : list W) (rs : list req)
(acc : list W) : list W :=
fold_left (response data) rs acc.
(* Specification of the server main() function *)
Definition mainS := SPEC("cmd", "cmdLen", "data", "dataLen")
reserving 15 Al r, Al d,
PRE[V] array (encodeAll r) (V "cmd") ∗ array d (V "data")
∗ mallocHeap
∗ d V "cmdLen" = length (encodeAll r) e
∗ d V "dataLen" = length d e
∗ d goodSize (length (encodeAll r) + 3) e
POST[R] array (encodeAll r) (V "cmd") ∗ array d (V "data")
∗ mallocHeap ∗ sll (responseAll d r nil) R.
(* Omitted: lemmas and tactics about lists *)
(* Correctness theorem *)
Theorem ok : moduleOk m.
Proof.
vcgen; abstract (parse0; for0; post; evaluate hints;
repeat (parse1 finish; use_match);
multi_ex; sep hints; finish).
Qed.
visit in the loop (Where clause). The key property of For is that
it performs compile-time analysis of the Where condition to op-
timize query execution. If the Where condition implies a known
value for the array index, the “loop” only visits that cell. If the con-
dition implies a lower bound on array indices, the loop skips the
earlier indices. The proof rule of the For macro hides the details of
which optimizations are used, allowing verification to proceed only
in terms of high-level logical concepts.
The righthand column of Figure 7 excerpts the specification
and correctness proof for the program. The specification follows
the Bedrock style of using pure functional programs as speci-
fications for low-level programs. In particular, we define func-
tional datatypes to represent requests to the server, and we write
functional programs to map requests to their network encod-
ings and their appropriate responses. The three different kinds
of queries are represented with capitalized datatype constructors
(e.g., ValueIsGe) and specified with pure mathematical functions
in lowercase (e.g., valueIsGe).
The specification mainS applies to our main function, giving
its list of formal arguments, the arrays cmd and data plus their
lengths. Two universal quantifiers (“Al”) bind names to the purely
functional versions of cmd and data, respectively.
The precondition (PRE) clause binds a local function V that may
be used to access the actual parameter values (e.g., V "cmd" as the
value of cmd). The first three ∗-separated formulas here say, respec-
tively, that there are regions with an array pointed to by parameter
cmd and storing an encoding of the queries, an array pointed to by
parameter data and storing an encoding of the database, and finally
the internal data structures of the malloc library. Further subfor-
mulas use the lifting operator d e, for lifting normal Coq proposi-
tions into separation logic formulas. We require that cmdLen and
dataLen store the lengths of the proper arrays, and we require that
adding 3 to the query array length does not overflow a 32-bit word
(which the goodSize predicate formalizes).
A postcondition (POST) binds the local variable R to stand for
the return value. Here we assert that the same two arrays remain
in memory unchanged, the malloc library state is intact, and the
return value is the root of a linked list.
Finally, the program is proved to meet its spec with a short
sequences of Coq tactics. Some of them, like vcgen and sep,
come from the Bedrock library. Others, like parse0 and for0,
come from the libraries providing the Match and For macros. In
this way, macro authors can also provide reusable procedures for
discharging the sorts of verification conditions that their macros
generate, while leaving the programmer full flexibility to apply
other proof techniques instead.
Some details are omitted in the figure. The main implemen-
tation includes 7 invariants, predicates over intermediate program
states that guide verification condition generation. Together these
invariants take up 72 lines of code. We also omit 350 lines of lemma
statements and proof script, setting up the key arguments behind
the program’s correctness. Crucially, these lemmas are only about
properties of lists, our functional models of arrays and imperative
linked lists; we need do no manual proving work specific to pro-
gram syntax, program states, or memories.
This program uses at least 7 different macros, at varying lev-
els of abstraction from statement sequencing to declarative query-
ing, but the verification is independent of macro implementation
details. The level of proof automation used here also means that
small changes to the program often require little manual adaptation
of proofs. Nonetheless, in the end we get a foundational theorem,
stated in terms of a simple assembly-level operational semantics
and with a proof checked by the normal Coq proof checker. Fur-
thermore, the example program runs only about 25% more slowly
than a conventional C program for the same task, as compared to
an OCaml implementation we built at a similar level of abstraction,
which runs in about 400% of the time of the C program. We return
to performance details in Section 6.
5.2 Parsing Arrays of Machine Words
Consider now the general interface of the parsing macro from
Figure 7. Its simplest form is as follows:
Match array Size size Position pos {
Case pattern bodyStmt end
} Default { defaultStmt }
Here the challenge is giving the macro a strong enough interface
without revealing its internal workings. We intentionally set out
to hide the details of array access, but programmers should still
be able to prove reasonable correctness theorems about programs
that use this macro. One concrete challenge is which precondition
we choose as the input to bodyStmt, a sub-statement that is run
when pattern-matching succeeds. We do not want to mention the
exact sequence of instructions executed between the start of the
Match and that point. If we did, the programmer would need to
reason about memory safety and semantics of a sequence of array
accesses, on every invocation of the macro.
The alternate approach that we take here is to construct a
bodyStmt precondition in terms of a simpler instruction sequence,
different from the one actually executed, but with the same effect.
The instruction sequence is written in terms of the functional model
of the array, a Coq list.
For instance, the pattern 0 ++ "posn" ++ "lower" from Figure
7 matches an array span starting with constant 0 and followed by
any two other values, such that those two values are bound to names
posn and lower before running bodyStmt. LetL be a mathematical
list asserted to describe the contents of the array. The semantics of
the example match may now be expressed with, first, an assertion
that L = a, b, c, . . . for fresh variables a, b, and c; and second, this
instruction sequence:
assume(a = 0); posn← b; lower← c
We express exactly the intent of the pattern, without exposing any
details of array access. Instruction sequences like the above are
handled trivially by Bedrock’s proof automation, without imposing
memory safety proof obligations on the programmer. It is easy to
code a recursive Coq function to translate a pattern into such a
sequence of instructions.
The postcondition of the Match macro is just the disjunction of
the postconditions for bodyStmt and defaultStmt, when they are
passed preconditions constructed using the encoding technique
above. The verification conditions include some administrative
facts about variables: all program variables mentioned are declared
as local variables, and the variables array and pos are not also
used within patterns. The verification conditions of bodyStmt and
defaultStmt are also inherited. Finally, one new verification condi-
tion asserts that the overall precondition for the Match implies that
there exists an array at the address specified by array, where pos is
a valid index into that array, and adding the length of the pattern to
pos does not overflow a 32-bit word.
5.3 Declarative Querying of Arrays
Figure 7 demonstrated the For macro, which loops over exactly
those cells of an array that satisfy a filter condition. The macro
implementation analyzes the syntax of the condition to perform
optimizations. Such a process is a simplified version of what goes
on in an SQL query planner. The interface of the For macro should
hide the details of the optimizations that are performed.
Our complete implementation uses a form of loop invariant that
is similar to the one introduced by Tuerk [31], where an invariant
includes both a precondition and a postcondition to simplify appli-
cation of the separation logic frame rule. However, we will present
here a simplified version with only a conventional loop invariant.
There the general form of a For invocation is:
[After prefix PRE[V] invariant]
For index Holding value in array Size len Where condition
{ bodyStmt }
The condition may refer both to local variables and to the special
variables Index and Value for the current array index and cell
value, respectively. Our current implementation performs two opti-
mizations: When condition is a conjunction where one conjunct is
Index = i, then the “loop” need only visit cell i. When condition
is a conjunction where one conjunct is Index ≥ i, then the loop
may begin at i rather than 0. The optimizer correctly handles cases
where i is a local variable.
As in the previous subsection, here we have the challenge of
assigning For a specification that does not reveal too much about
its inner workings. Ideally, programmers who use For will only be
faced with proof obligations about mathematical lists, not arrays or
the details of compiling complex Boolean tests. This time, we use
the conventional idea of a loop invariant, but modified to expose a
list-level view of the action.
The schematic For invocation above includes a loop invariant,
where an After clause introduces a local name prefix for the list
of array cell values that have already been visited. In the course of
a naive complete loop through the array, prefix progresses from the
empty list to the full value list. However, optimizations may lead to
some loop iterations being skipped, though such details should be
hidden in the interface of For.
We are now ready to sketch what that interface is. The postcon-
dition is simply that there exists an array in memory pointed to by
array, such that the loop invariant holds for the full array contents.
Verification conditions include both administrative requirements on
variable names and the inherited verification condition of bodyStmt.
The more interesting conditions are:
1. The loop invariant is independent of the values of index and
value, which will often be changed without calling the loop
body to fast forward past indices that the optimizer determines
cannot match the filter condition. (Note that the invariant may
still depend on the functional list of array cells already visited,
just not on the values of local variables used incidentally to
track progress in visiting cells.)
2. The precondition implies the loop invariant.
3. When the loop invariant holds for an array value prefix L, and
when the filter condition will reject the next value if it equals v,
then the loop invariant also holds for prefix L, v. This condition
is crucial to justify the soundness of fast forwarding.
4. The postcondition of bodyStmt implies the loop invariant, where
bodyStmt is passed a suitably high-level precondition expressed
in terms of mathematical lists and the loop invariant.
6. Evaluation
Together, the core macro system definitions and all of the macros
we have built on top of them take up about 4000 lines of Coq code
within the Bedrock library.
We have built a few tactics to lower the cost of macro imple-
mentation, but our primary interest has been in the effort required
to implement and verify individual programs, like the example of
Figure 7. An important part of evaluation is the run-time perfor-
mance of programs, since we motivated certified low-level macros
with the possibility to combine the high performance of low-level
languages with the abstractions of high-level languages. To gather
C OCaml (1O) OCaml (HO) Bedrock
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Figure 8. Running time (in seconds) of the four different imple-
mentations of the server example, running the same randomly gen-
erated workload of 200 queries on an array of 100,000 elements
some rough evidence that our implementation succeeds in this re-
spect, we ran an experiment with four different implementations of
the same “server” example1:
1. A conventional C program (50 lines) not taking advantage of
metaprogramming. This is our baseline of high performance.
2. A first-order (later abbreviated 1O) OCaml program (36 lines),
with no variant types (beyond linked lists) or first-class func-
tions. This is our baseline of the cost of switching to a popular
high-level language.
3. A higher-order (later abbreviated HO) OCaml program (106
lines, including reusable library code), taking advantage of id-
ioms like parser combinators and embedded interpreters for
ASTs. This version illustrates the cost of employing nice ab-
stractions that can be type checked in isolation, which is not the
case for abstractions embodied as Camlp4 macros.
4. The Bedrock implementation from Figure 7 (50 lines, compiled
to 561 lines of assembly with the Bedrock malloc library
linked in), which is the only one of the implementations that
we verified as correct.
Figure 8 shows the results of running all four compiled pro-
grams on a particular random workload chosen to be large enough
for performance differences to show. These experiments were run
on a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon processor with 12 GB of RAM, using
GCC 4.4.5 and OCaml 3.12.1. They show the first-order OCaml
program running in roughly 300% of the time of the C program,
with the higher-order OCaml program running in roughly 500%
of the C program’s time. In contrast, the Bedrock program runs in
about 125% of the time of the C program. We replicated the experi-
ment on a 4.2 GHz AMD FX processor with 16 GB of RAM, where
the performance difference between C and Bedrock was within the
granularity of measurement, and the first- and higher-order OCaml
programs ran respectively in about 300% and 350% of the time for
the C and Bedrock programs. It is worth pointing out that Bedrock
is the only language implementation used here that does not yet
have an optimizer, whereas we used the default optimization op-
tions of each other compiler, gcc and the ocamlopt native-code
OCaml compiler.
We experimented with verifying programs for several months
before generating any executable assembly code. The first program
we actually executed was iterative factorial, and the second was the
server program in Figure 7. Both worked correctly on the first try,
providing at least some small testament to the debugging power of
our verification environment.
We have verified a few other substantial case studies, as detailed
in Figure 9, breaking down their lines of code into relevant cate-
gories. The case studies include some classic functions over imper-
1 In directory examples/comparison of the Bedrock distribution
File Program Invar. Tactics Other Overh.
Server 50 79 167 239 9.7
LinkedList 42 26 27 31 2.0
Malloc 43 16 112 94 5.2
ListSet 50 31 23 46 2.0
TreeSet 108 40 25 45 1.0
Queue 53 22 80 93 3.7
Memoize 26 13 56 50 4.6
Figure 9. Case study verifications, with data on annotation burden,
in lines of code
ative linked lists, the malloc library, implementations of a single
finite set abstract data type interface with both unsorted lists and
binary search trees, an implementation of the bag abstract data type
using a queue, and an implementation of an abstract data type of
memoized functions, where a closure stored in memory contains
both a function pointer and an associated 1-element memo table.
All case studies are built up from certified low-level macros, where
our running example Server uses the most advanced macros.
In Figure 9, the program column counts lines of executable
code; invar. refers to function specs, loop invariants, and post-
function call invariants; tactics refers to literal proofs of theorems
as well as reusable tactic functions and hints; and other collects
the remaining lines, which are mostly helper function definitions
and lemma statements. We omit lines of code that are duplicated
between Coq modules and their interfaces.
The final column of Figure 9 gives the verification overhead,
or ratio of verification code to executable code. The more basic
examples range from overheads of 1.0 to 5.2, which compare rea-
sonably well to common ratios in Coq developments, such as the
overhead of about 7 in the original CompCert paper [21]. The over-
head is slightly below 10 for our server example, which involves a
fair amount of program-specific correctness reasoning.
We should also point out that the code size statistics from the
original Bedrock paper [8] can also be taken as evidence for the
effectiveness of the macro system presented in this paper, which
is a moderate evolution of the macro system used previously and
never presented in detail before.
The main weakness of our present implementation is the run-
ning time of automated proof search and proof checking. On the
machines used in the experiments, the server example runs for
about an hour finding and checking proofs. The other case stud-
ies take less time, but still have running times measured in min-
utes, at best. We do not view this as a huge obstacle from a scien-
tific perspective, as much opportunity remains to take advantage of
parallelism. The Server example generates about 100 independent
verification conditions, each of which could be discharged on a dif-
ferent processor core, dropping the total verification time for the
example to a few minutes. We need only wait for Coq to support
forking processes to handle disjoint subgoals of a single proof.
7. Related Work
The original Bedrock paper [8] used a simpler macro system but
did not report on its details. Compared to that macro system, our
new one from this paper is distinguished by including a calling
convention supporting named local variables, as well as the im-
plementation and verification of high-level macros like our parsing
and querying examples.
Benton et al. [2] report on a system for formal verification of
assembly programs in Coq using higher-order separation logic.
Based on an intermediate language with scoped local labels, they
define a few macros of moderate complexity, like while loop and
function call (the latter handling only storing the return pointer to
a register, not stack frame management). Proofs are largely manual
with interspersed use of automation tactics, leading to about 10
lines of proof per line of assembly code, as opposed to an about
even ratio between the two in our most complicated macro-based
example. Their work explores an interesting alternate separation
logic featuring a novel higher-order frame rule. We expect that an
approach like ours in this paper could be adapted to the formalism
of Benton et al. and many others, as our respective projects deal
mostly with orthogonal concerns.
Work by Myreen et al. [24, 25] has demonstrated another mech-
anized separation logic suitable for reasoning about realistic as-
sembly languages. The FLINT project has produced XCAP [26],
the assembly-level program logic we adopt in this work, as well as
several other logics targeting interesting aspects of assembly pro-
gram behavior [5, 10–12, 23]. Other related work with mechanized
separation logic has gone on at the level of C programs, as in Ap-
pel et al.’s Verified Software Toolchain [1]. Mechanized proofs in
these logics have been long and manual, and previously no macro
system had been demonstrated for them at the level of this paper’s
most sophisticated examples.
The L4.verified kernel verification project [20] employs a
tool [15] for verified translation of C code into functional pro-
grams in higher-order logic, applying optimizations that choose
simpler types for functions that use fewer varieties of side effect.
In a sense, their tool reverses the action of the Bedrock macro
system, providing similar foundational guarantees for the fixed C
language. In contrast, our work makes it possible for programmers
to add their own new language constructs, including higher-level
macros like our declarative array querying that are unlikely to be
reconstructible automatically from C code.
Macros have been most studied in the context of Lisp and
Scheme. Notable in that area is work by Herman and Wand [17],
which shows how to assign macros interfaces sufficient to guar-
antee hygiene, or lack of undesirable variable capture, without the
need to expand macro definitions to check program validity. Our
work also assigns interfaces to macros, for low-level rather than
high-level code, and facilitating formal verification of functional
correctness rather than just proper use of binding constructs.
In the functional programming world, the use of embedded
domain-specific languages is already quite popular, for supporting
safe code generation to low-level languages via high-level func-
tional programs. For instance, the Harpy Haskell library [14] sup-
ports generation of x86 assembly code. Recent tools like Meta-
Haskell [22] allow generation of programs in low-level languages
like C, CUDA, and assembly, where Haskell-level type checking
guarantees that code generators will never output type-incorrect
programs. Our work in this paper can be viewed as starting from
the same foundation of type-safe metaprogramming and expanding
it to support verification of functional correctness.
Extensible C variants like xtc [16] and xoc [9] allow the pro-
grammer to specify new statement forms and static checking dis-
ciplines. These systems can provide much nicer syntax than what
we have available within Coq, and there is room for such features
to migrate to proof assistants. The key disadvantage of existing ex-
tensible compilers is that they provide no foundational guarantees;
custom static analysis disciplines do not have clear semantics, so
these languages are not compatible with foundational verification
of functional correctness.
Safe “systems languages” include low-level languages like Cy-
clone [19] and various higher-level languages with features targeted
at systems programming. Some are known for their use in particu-
lar operating systems projects, such as Modula-3 in SPIN [4] and
Sing# in Singularity [18]. None of these languages are extensible,
and none give foundational safety or functional correctness guar-
antees.
Tools like Smallfoot [3] and Space Invader [6, 32] apply sep-
aration logic to check memory safety of low-level programs auto-
matically. Other systems, including TVLA [29] and XISA [7], can
verify memory safety or even functional correctness using other
formalisms for data structure invariants. These tools apply to fixed
programming languages with no modular macro systems.
8. Conclusion
We have presented certified low-level macros, a technique sup-
porting metaprogramming for low-level software, where programs
may be verified formally without looking inside the definitions of
macros. Rather, macros export formal interfaces that include pred-
icate transformers and verification condition generators. We have
demonstrated how to build up a C-like language stack, starting from
a simple intermediate language and culminating in high-level no-
tation for tasks like parsing and declarative querying that are usu-
ally supported via ad-hoc external tools. Concrete programs have
mostly automated Coq proofs, generating foundational results with
statements independent of our macro system; and the performance
of our compiled programs is competitive with C programs.
One direction for future research is optimization of the pro-
grams that result from macro expansion. As these programs are in a
form more like conventional assembly language than conventional
compiler intermediate languages, it is not obvious how to do sound
optimization. We plan to investigate how we might take advantage
of the verified preconditions associated with all basic blocks, to re-
cover semantic information and perhaps allow optimizations that
are too difficult to implement with traditional dataflow analysis.
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